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Introduction
Aviation maintenance is an environment with high system complexity and much human
involvement. These factors can make aviation maintenance activities prone to errors that are not
immediately noticed. Some mistakes do not become apparent until an accident or incident has
occurred (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016). With the aviation industry typically succeeding in
avoiding catastrophes while operating in a high-risk environment, the standard measure of using
lagging indicators to assess safety performance is difficult (Gazica et al., 2018). The lagging
indicator style of feedback could mean that aviation maintenance personnel may be conducting
unsafe maintenance practices before the error is uncovered. Some research has shown that a
blame culture also exists in aviation maintenance, making the reporting of mistakes problematic
at best (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016). The goal of any safety program is to keep the number of
unsafe events acceptably low for the environment, the public, and the workers (Hollnagel, 2014).
A measure of acceptably low is subjective; regulation will specify the threshold of safe
operation while the public opinion may indicate that any aviation accident with a loss of life is
unacceptable (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016). For the commercial aviation industry, the acceptable
level of safety is established and monitored by a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in the United States, and is defined for each individually based on the
target level of safety for each different service provider (SKYbrary, 2021a). American Airlines
(AA), with the support of senior leadership, has started to explore new means of improving
safety in the cockpit with an invitation to the airline industry, and other industries, to collaborate
and share methods and ideas to improve safety (SKYbrary, 2021b).
The question to be researched is if the application of new safety theories beyond
the cockpit and in an aviation maintenance environment could mitigate unsafe maintenance
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practices before said practices result in the realization of an aviation accident with loss of life.
Stakeholders who would benefit from this research are the aviation maintenance certificate
holders who perform maintenance. Considering the aviation maintenance environment’s
description from Langer and Braithwaite (2016), expansion beyond a centralized control of
procedural safety would be beneficial. Direct observation on the flight deck of an aircraft is a
normalized part of pilot assessment while direct observation of maintenance actions on aircraft is
unusual, even for training and assessment. Such observations have the potential to change the
behavior of the maintainer because of the sense of intrusion by the observer into normal
maintenance operations. Flight crews also typically have immediate feedback on undesired
aircraft states while maintainers do not have the same benefit (Langer & Braithwaite, 2016).
Secondly, other stakeholders who would benefit would be the aircraft’s aircrew; improvements
in aviation maintenance safety could lead to more airframe availability and reliability. Third, the
ultimate stakeholder would be the aviation customer participating in commercial flight
operations with less risk from maintenance errors. This research has significance for aviation
safety with the potential to reduce the risk of maintenance errors and the identification of
organizational safety constraints that may be evaluated again to validate the necessity of those
specific constraints in the aviation maintenance environment.
Background
AA began exploring Safety-II to improve risk management in the cockpit and beyond in
2018 (SKYbrary, 2021b). Dr. Erik Hollnagel published many works on Safety-II and accident
prevention starting in the early 2000s, and AA’s safety leadership became interested in the
concepts he had developed. Dr. Hollnagel focuses on intelligent man-machine systems, cognitive
systems engineering, human reliability analysis, and resilience engineering and is, at the time of
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writing, the Senior Professor of Patient Safety at the University of Jonkoping, Sweden
(Hollnagel, 2021). While AA currently operates under what Dr. Hollnagel would describe as
Safety-I, AA wanted to further explore the concepts of Safety-II through their Line Operational
Safety Audit (LOSA) program. The goal for AA’s Learning Improvement Team (LIT) is to
develop proof of concept, refine the program to expand beyond their LOSA, and introduce the
program to the aviation industry. In addition to working directly with Dr. Hollnagel, AA’s LIT
has partnered with The Ohio State University to help maintain alignment with the Safety-II
principles and continue rigorous data collection methods (AA Department of Flight Safety [AA
DFS], 2020).
Initially, AA’s LIT worked with hand-selected AA Check Airmen to collect data in a
narrative format from pre-identified crews noted as high performers during regular flights. This
narrative format was difficult for AA’s LIT to work with, and the data collection method was
changed from narratives to an objective data-oriented approach. This data collection tool, hosted
on Microsoft Excel, went through rapid prototyping, and resulted in no less than six versions
(AA DFS, 2020).
In parallel to the data collection efforts, AA’s LIT developed a Safety-II model centered
on Resilience Engineering (RE). RE has been designing resilience into hardware and software
systems and those methods have been applied to complex socio-technical systems where human
performance is necessary for overall system resilience. In that complex system, AA’s LIT
postulates that RE has a central tenet in practice that resilience cannot be built into the system
but can be developed by the organization and the individual workers that lead to resilient
performance. In AA’s LIT’s model, learn, plan, adapt, and coordinate are the four factors that
lead to resilience as developed through the study of the LOSA program. The new model
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contrasts with the currently understood Safety-I program that AA pilots now use. Currently, AA
pilots operate under the “ABCs for Threat and Error Management (TEM); actively monitor and
assess potential for error, balance available barriers to avoid & trap errors, communicate threats
& intentions timely & effectively, follow SOPs.” (AA DFS, 2020, p. 8).
Statement of the Problem
With Safety-II decentralizing safety decision-making, decentralization could be an
appropriate method to use in the regulated environment of aviation maintenance. With AA
conducting a proof of concept of Safety-II in the LOSA, the potential exists to expand the proof
of concept to the aircraft maintenance environment (AA DFS, 2020). The expansion could give
first-level supervisors a dynamic means of addressing the performance of some maintenance
tasks that arise during aircraft maintenance that may violate a centralized organizational safety
policy. However, the applied approach is still compliant with 29 CFR § 1910 et seq Occupational
Safety and Health Standards (1974) regulations. The violation of an overly restrictive
organizational safety standard during some aircraft maintenance actions can allow aircraft
maintenance to occur, reducing the risk of a maintenance error and improving the aircraft’s
overall safety.
Methodology
The method used in this study is a case study based on the white paper from the AA DFS
(2020) and their work on implementing Safety-II into their LOSA. The research was conducted
by searching for peer-reviewed articles relating to Safety-II, LOSA, and safety surveys. The
white paper released information from the AA DFS (2020). The search terms for the peerreviewed articles from the last five years are “Safety-II,” “Line Operations Safety Assessment,”
“Aviation Maintenance Safety Surveys,” “Safety Surveys,” and “Aviation Maintenance Safety.”
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Hollnagel’s (2014) book on Safety-I and Safety-II was included. The sources were subjectively
analyzed based on the article abstract and selected for inclusion based on Aviation Maintenance
Safety, LOSA, and Safety-II theories. The methodology, results, and discussion of the sources
selected were reviewed to ascertain relevance of the study in relation to this work and to find
results that either supported or contradicted findings of the other sources used. A case study was
appropriate for this study as a real experiment is not feasible. AA is conducting a quasiexperiment of Safety-II application in a limited capacity in their LOSA program (AA DFS,
2020). Lagging indicators of risk realization is a factor that would prevent an experiment in the
aviation environment. Organizational risk assessments of experimentation may result in
unacceptable risk for organizations as the consequences of a realized risk have a potential for
serious injury or death. While other industries are starting to apply Safety-II theories, many of
those industries are operating in environments that could be more forgiving than the environment
the aviation industry is working in. A true experiment in the true environment carries an
unacceptable level of risk for all the stakeholders.
Literature Review
Safety Culture
Safety, as defined by Provan et al. (2020), is the “…ability for a system to perform its
intended purpose, whilst preventing harm to persons” (Introduction, para. 2). For some
operations, safety is the combined actions and decisions of anyone interacting with the system.
Organizational leaders create a safety culture by prioritizing safety to influence the employees to
hold safety as a priority (Provan et al., 2020). Safety culture is described by Key et al. (2020) as
the employee’s perception of how much an organization values safety and the level of risk
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acceptance in accomplishing tasks. The work environment also plays a role in shaping safety
culture (Key et al., 2020).
A familiar term in the aviation industry is “safety climate.” Safety culture and safety
climate share similar abstract ideas (Chiu et al., 2019). Safety climate is intended to reduce
injuries and accidents by affecting the employee perceptions of policies and practices in the
organization. Safety climate is designed to work through a centralized safety practice that
encourages compliance with the policies and practices through managerial behaviors and
procedures. Research has shown that safety outcomes have a link with safety climate.
Gazica et al. (2018) conducted a study on a limited population of aviation flight students.
They found a significant relationship between individual safety motivation and personal feelings
of participating in their occupational calling. Those individuals who felt they were called to the
occupation of flying had higher safety motivation than those who did not feel the same. The
study did note the limit of generalizability to other aviation populations and presents
opportunities for further research. Other research has found that safety climate has been a
predictor for safety motivation and the intention to adhere to safety policies, which has been a
predictor of organizational safety performance (Gazica et al., 2018).
Current Aviation Maintenance Safety
Aviation maintenance safety culture is measured and assessed with surveys. Large
employers have the resources available to fund a workforce survey that includes analysis and
interpretation from professionals. Smaller organizations may not have the resources available for
a similar assessment. Large and small organizations face a similar problem with employee
surveys: participation is typically low, and the responses may not be sincere. The lack of
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sincerity comes from anonymity concerns, specifically, if management can identify individuals
based on information such as shift or job role (Key et al., 2020).
In a military aviation maintenance environment, safety climate and command culture
surveys are used as the primary means of assessing the individual perception of safety in the
squadron, like other maintenance organizations. The surveys are conducted and analyzed by an
external contracted company, with results only presented to the squadron commander. However,
the extensive collection of demographic data, including rank, military occupation code, division,
and maintenance shift, led many to believe they could be identified by the command and singled
out for their responses, like the blame culture noted by Langer and Braithwaite (2016). The
consensus in the division was the survey was another task to be completed, a task that would not
result in any changes to safety or safety culture in the squadron because of insincere responses
from most respondents. Anonymity was assured through providing the answers seemingly
desired by the command.
Safety-I
Khoshkhoo et al. (2018) described the three categories of errors: spontaneous errors,
errors linked to threats, and additional errors resulting from a chain of events. Those errors
should be controlled from a Safety-I standpoint through predictive and proactive measures
(Khoshkhoo et al., 2018). Safety-I is the method typically used in Aviation; for American
Airlines, the Threat and Error Management (TEM) process uses procedures, checklists,
automation, external resources, and crew experience to monitor proactively, balance, and
communicate threats (AA DFS, 2020). From Safety-I perspective, the employees are liabilities to
safety where the safe environment is typified as an absence of accidents and incidents.
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With the idea of preventing an incident as a mainstay, incidences may result in further
updates and new procedures that further restrict the employees’ work. The new restrictions are
meant to limit the freedom of choice for employees responding to work situations with the idea
of reducing any human error in the work conducted (Jones et al., 2018). The addition of
restrictions is consistent with what Hollnagel (2014) describes as a Safety-I myth where the
causes of threats can be prevented, thus improving safety. The resulting idea is that a zero-defect
or zero accident environment is the ideal environment and can be attained through mitigating
threats (Hollnagel, 2014).
Though there is much support for current centralized safety practices in aviation, these
practices have some weaknesses. Safety culture can vary inside an organization, from the frontline personnel in the hangar to the management staff. Chiu et al. (2019) point out that the
proximity to risk between the different groups in the organization influences risk decision
making and is consistent with the culture-structures-processes model regarding the change in the
strength of safety culture at various organizational levels. With the close links between the
organizational structure, safety culture, and the resulting decisions, there are recommendations to
use safety training to influence an organization’s safety culture.
Chiu et al. (2019) conducted a study to develop a predictive model and found a few
surprising results. For individuals, no significant relationship was found between safety training
and the individual valuation of safety. This result does not suggest stopping safety training but
continuing research into safety training to determine the benefit to the organization (Chiu et al.,
2019).
The gap in the ability of Safety-I to account for and control risk is summed up by
Hollnagel (2014):
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This problem was addressed 30 years ago when the British psychologist Lisanne
Bainbridge, in a discussion of automation, pointed out that ‘the designer who tries
to eliminate the operator still leaves the operator to do the tasks which the
designer cannot think how to automate.’ This argument is not only valid for
automation design but applies to work specification and workplace design in
general (p. 126).
Safety-II
Safety-II focuses on decentralizing control when it comes to complex, dynamic, and
variable systems or environments. An idea behind Safety-II is the proactive management of risk
and viewing deviations from the procedure as attempts by the workers to manage a complex
system (Jones et al., 2018). Hollnagel’s (2014) idea is to switch from asking what can go wrong
to questioning how and why things go right in unexpected and expected conditions. The switch
in idea can lead to understanding why adjustments and variability of performance lead to success
(Hollnagel, 2014). Safety-I procedures do not account for system complexity, and the workers
attempt to negotiate the grey areas between procedure and efficiency to meet mission goals.
These negotiations result in procedural violations that occur in many different fields, most of
which were never intended to cause harm (Jones et al., 2018).
This work leads into RE, where systems are developed and operated to adapt to the
variable conditions of the environment where they operate (AA DFS, 2020). Wahl et al. (2020)
describe RE as “…a key concept for ensuring safety in complex socio-technical systems”
(Introduction, para. 2). A similarity between RE and Safety-II is the importance of performance
variability and how organizations and people adapt to changes. The difference in view on
variability contrasts with the tenets of Safety-I, where variability is typically associated with a
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deviation from a set standard and should be constrained to prevent something from going wrong.
RE and Safety-II attempt to control rather than constrain variability to succeed in dynamic
environments (Wahl et al., 2020).
A challenge with Safety-II is handling social norms and other external pressures in the
work environment. Jones et al. (2018) conducted a study on community pharmacies and
procedural violations. Social norms could influence others to violate procedures in an
inappropriate situation because that violation is accepted in the work environment for many other
similar situations. Other external pressures, such as management throughput goals or business
pressure to increase efficiency, result in workers consciously deciding to violate a procedure if
the worker, with good intentions, judges the violation to not increase risk in the context of the
situation (Jones et al., 2018). Hollnagel (2014) describes such behavior with the EfficiencyThoroughness Trade-Off (ETTO) principle. Regardless of the restrictive safety procedures,
people will have to make trade-offs between thoroughly following the safety procedures and
being efficient at their work (Hollnagel, 2014). The Safety-II and Safety-I challenge is managing
external pressures in a complex system (Jones et al., 2018).
Applications for Safety-II
The AA introduction of Safety-II into the LOSA program is the only published aviation
application of Dr. Hollnagel’s principles in the aviation industry at the time of writing. Other
industries have applied Dr. Hollnagel’s principles into their training programs, such as the
maritime industry. Maritime shipping is still a dangerous line of work, with 2,712 casualties and
94 lost ships in 2017. Wahl et al. (2020) conducted a study on the application of Safety-II
principles in simulator training for shuttle tanker dynamic positioning systems in offloading oil
from an offshore oil field. Each of the participants were qualified, experienced dynamic
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positioning system operators. While the tenets of Safety-I were important for the procedural
steps of approaching and connecting with the offshore unit, the addition of Safety-II to manage
and control variability in sea and wind conditions and managing minor errors in simulation
fostered a learning environment where information was shared between peers. Understanding
and working with the variability encountered during simulation increased student confidence in
the system’s operation (Wahl et al., 2020).
Discussion
Safety in aviation maintenance is multi-faceted, with any safety violation having the
potential to result in death or serious bodily harm to any of the participants, particularly the
airline customers who have no control over the conduct of maintenance or flight. Extrapolating
the findings from Gazica et al. (2018) can lead to the conclusion that an aviation maintenance
technician who has found their calling may be more thorough with the application of safety
regulations than an aviation maintenance technician who is just working a job. They may have a
higher valuation of safety than their peers who have not found their calling. However, those who
have found their calling in aviation maintenance may still be faced with the ETTO principle
described by Hollnagel (2014).
The pressure to complete a maintenance task for the aircraft to be on the flight schedule
increases pressure on the aviation maintenance technician; a looming deadline may cause some
to become less thorough with safety and more focused on efficiency. Some safety regulations are
routinely violated to make a maintenance task more efficient or easier to accomplish. In a
hypothetical example, when changing out a bearing in the non-rotating controls of a helicopter,
one of the larger sockets from the toolbox would be used to support the collective controls to
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make access easier to the bearing. Most of the time, the large socket would be put back into the
toolbox after the job.
On one occasion, the socket was not returned to the toolbox and was discovered during
the change of shift toolbox inspection. The socket was found, but no changes to procedures
occurred because this was an acceptable deviation for efficiency. The accepted deviation may be
a good example of the ETTO principle incorporated into acceptable safety violations in a
squadron.
There is much value in the application of Safety-I concepts. Aviation maintenance
technicians can use published maintenance procedures to keep themselves more on the
thoroughness of work side of Hollnagel’s (2014) ETTO principle. Thoroughness of work can be
accomplished by resisting pleas from management to be more efficient to meet tighter
maintenance turnaround times. The inclusion of Safety-II principles can improve the relationship
between thoroughness in applying procedure and the need to be efficient.
Using the Safety-II idea of focusing on what went right instead of what went wrong, the
previous example of improper tool usage demonstrates a violation of tool control and
maintenance procedures. What went right was the change of shift tool inspection resulted in the
discovery of the missing socket. What went right was the aircraft maintenance was completed
without any injury, the aircraft was available for the flight schedule, and the inspector on the job
learned to inspect toolboxes and not explicitly trust senior aviation maintenance technicians.
Safety-I processes resolved an issue created through the ETTO principle and the maintenance
team’s application of Safety-II principles.
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Conclusion
Returning to the research question of “if the application of new safety theories could
mitigate unsafe maintenance practices,” research in other industries indicates that it may succeed
when included with Safety-I processes. However, individual safety valuation is a factor in
applying safety policies, and safety training is not significant in affecting personal valuation
(Chiu et al., 2019). The normalization of procedural violations also plays a role in the thorough
application of safety in the workplace (Jones et al., 2018). More research into applying Safety-II
to high-risk aviation organizations is recommended to develop a means to use it for aviation
maintenance.
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